was held out at the time as a kind of constitution.
3 It retained its status as a basic law despite the adoption of the ZAR Constitutions of 1858, 1889 and 1896, 4 and was only repealed in 1901 after the British annexation of the ZAR. 5 This contribution takes a look at the impact of the Thirty-Three Articles on the legal development of the ZAR, fi rst, by examining the nature and content of the Thirty-Three Articles and, secondly, by studying a few examples of case law in which it was followed.
2
The nature of the Thirty-Three Articles
Scholars have described the Thirty-Three Articles by using a myriad of phrases: a mirror of the political views of the Voortrekkers; 6 the foundation of the judicial administration of the ZAR; 7 the primary legislation of the state with regard to judicial administration;
8 "a mixed bag of legal provisions mostly of a criminal nature"; 9 a code of conduct;
10 "a collection of regulations dealing mainly with criminal law"; 11 as belonging to the category of standard state legislation; 12 and as the law code of an undeveloped society. 13 Scholars disagree on whether the Thirty-Three Articles could be viewed as a constitution.
14 This is understandable because there is no standard defi nition of a constitution, as will appear shortly. The Thirty-Three Articles arguably contained several elements of a constitution. It indeed refl ected the national will and represented 3 Pelzer (n 2) at 115. The question whether it met the requirements for a constitution is considered in the next section. 4 See, respectively, GW Eybers Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History 1795 -1910 (London, 1918 ) doc 182 at 362-410; doc 218 at 485-488; and doc 227 at 505. 5 Procl 34 of 1901 (Transvaal). In terms of this proclamation, Milner repealed a long list of statutes, government notices and Volksraad resolutions issued by the former ZAR government. 6 Wichmann (n 1) at 38. 7 Idem at 41. 8 " [D] ie wet van die staat ... waarvolgens 'n voorkomende saak in die eerste plek beoordeel is": Pelzer (n 2) at 115. 9 Ian Farlam "The old authorities in South African practice" (2007) 19 and "contain [ed] an effectively established presumption of public rule in accordance with principles or conventions, expressed as law, that cannot easily be suspended". 20 Nevertheless, the Thirty-Three Articles lacks other essential elements of a constitution. Importantly, it does not say anything about the political structure of the state, its governmental institutions, or the relationship between the government and the citizens; 21 nor does it indicate the process for amending the document itself. 22 It is therefore submitted that the Thirty-Three Articles was not a constitution in the true sense of the word and should, at least for purposes of this contribution, not be seen as such. 23 A closer inspection of the content of the Thirty-Three Articles reveals that the best description is probably that of Sir John Gilbert Kotzé, esteemed Chief Justice of the ZAR in later years. 24 He observed that the Thirty-Three Articles "form[ed] … a brief code or instruction, prescribing the rule of conduct for the early community of pioneers". 25 The Thirty-Three Articles was not drafted by lawyers, but by the community itself. 26 Its provisions were therefore not formulated in legal or even offi cial language, but rather represented the viewpoints of the general populace. sociological defi nition of a constitution. 21 Rautenbach (n 15) at 20-21; Ryan (n 19) at 9, 12; Thornhill (n 20) at 11. 22 Ryan (n 19) at 12. 23 Unfortunately, space does not allow for a detailed discussion of this question. 24 President Burgers offered Kotzé the position of Chief Justice of the newly envisaged High Court in 1877; he accepted the offer. On his arrival in Pretoria, unfortunately, he found that Shepstone had already annexed the ZAR on behalf of Britain. Due to a lack of government funds, the British offered Kotzé the position as the only judge of the High Court, and not as one of three as originally planned. He accepted in the expectation that if additional judges were appointed, he would become Chief Justice. They were practical guidelines for establishing law and order in a pioneer society. They were, in fact, exactly what they purported to be, namely general provisions and laws relating to judicial administration. 28 This is evident from the provisions themselves, which will be discussed in the next section.
In its time, the Thirty-Three Articles was usually referred to either by name 29 or as the "Algemeene Bepalingen en Wetten" (General Provisions and Laws). 30 In only one document was it called "the Constitution". 31 Ordinary citizens did not hesitate to cite it, usually in conjunction with the (1858) Constitution, when petitioning the Volksraad concerning their rights.
32 Government offi cials, such as magistrates, commandants and fi eld-cornets, were expected to be familiar with the contents of the Thirty-Three Articles. 33 The magistrate for the district of Wakkerstroom requested copies of the Government Gazette, the Thirty-Three Articles and the Constitution because he did not know what was expected of him ("weet my niet te gedragen").
34
(See Bylaag 24, 1843 in JH Breytenbach (ed) Notule van die Natalse Volksraad (Volledig met alle Bylae daarby) (1838-1845) (Cape Town, sd) (hereafter Natal Volksraadsnotule) at 457)). Pelzer (n 2) at 115 attributes the document to AH Potgieter, the then political leader at Potchefstroom. Nevertheless, the identity of the individual drafters becomes irrelevant in view of the fact that the document was adopted by the elected body of representatives, the Burgerraad, and approved by the Volksraad fi ve years later. Moreover, its resilience over a period of fi fty-seven years and its use, not only by government offi cials and the courts, but also by ordinary members of the public (see n 32 infra), attests to its popularity and acceptance by the ZAR society as a whole. 27 Wichmann (n 1) at 38. 46 non-compliance with the rule that a person had to report 35 Various versions of this document are available (see Volksraadsnotule Part 1 (n 2) at 3-4). For purposes of this contribution, all references to the provisions of the Thirty-Three Articles will be to the version as published in Volksraadsnotule Part 1 (n 2) at 5-9. 36 Art 21. Although a specifi ed penalty was not determined, this provision stated that Dutch law should be followed. 37 Art 20 explicitly included patricide, infanticide and poisoning, all of which were punishable by death. 38 Art 19. The penalty was a fi ne of anything between Rds5 to Rds100 payable to the state. 39 Art 18. The penalty was a fi ne of anything between Rds5 to Rds100. The perpetrator also had to pay all (presumably legal) costs. If the victim's injuries were of such a nature that he required bedrest, the perpetrator also had to pay damages for the victim's time, pain and suffering. If the perpetrator was unable to pay these debts, he could be arrested. 40 Art 17. A person convicted of perjury would receive a sentence similar to that imposed on the person convicted of the original crime. 41 Art 14 applied only to doctors and members of the medical profession who issued false medical certifi cates or provided false evidence for the purpose of rendering an otherwise healthy person exempt from public service or to benefi t such a person; the penalty was a fi ne of Rds150 or imprisonment in accordance with the facts of the case. A doctor had to obtain the approval of the Burgerraad before being allowed to practise. 42 Art 22. The punishment was forced labour. 43 Art 3 provided that a person who disrupted the court proceedings and refused to comply with the presiding offi cial's order to leave, could be arrested and imprisoned for twenty-four hours or longer, depending on the circumstances. 44 Art 26 provided that a person who ignored a warning not to build too close to his neighbour, would forfeit all rights to that building. The dispute could be settled by way of arbitration before either the fi eld-cornet or the commandant, but if the parties could not reach an agreement, the matter had to be referred to the magistrate and the land commissioners. 45 Art 24. The penalty was a fi ne of Rds50. In cases where treasonous correspondence was suspected, a letter could be opened by a military commander; if the content of the letter proved harmless, the military commander had to deliver it to the correct address as soon as possible. This provision was later repealed by art 183 of the 1858 Constitution. From then, any person found guilty of opening the post of another would be punished severely ("ten strengste") with a fi ne of Rds500 and in accordance with the merits of the case. A person reporting such a crime could claim half of the fi ne amount as a reward (see the version of the 1858 Constitution published as Bylaag 2, 1858 in Volksraadsnotule Part 3 (n 30) 496-525 at 520). 46 Art 27. This crime specifi cally included insulting or slandering females and further only applied if the defamation caused the victim harm. The penalty was a fi ne of anything between Rds50 and Rds100, the monies being forfeited to the state. The version used in this contribution also included the following phrase at the end of the provision, namely "schennes, transportatie of de dood, naar de aard der zaak", which was removed from later drafts (Volksraadsnotule Part 1 (n 2) at 9 n 18; cf Eybers (n 26)). 2). It is also possible that the phrase merely represented notes made by the original drafters of the Thirty-Three Articles, indicating their initial thoughts on the crime ("schennis") and its possible punishments (banishment or the death penalty) which through oversight was not removed before the document was signed. 47 Art 25. The penalty was a fi ne of Rds5. A person was required to report to the fi eld-cornet of the area in which he had settled within fourteen days. 48 Art 28. The crime was considered so serious that it was punishable by either a fi ne of Rds500 or six months' imprisonment. In addition, the children involved had to be returned to their communities. 49 Art 33. A master was allowed to discipline his servants, but no abuse was tolerated. The punishment had to be determined in accordance with the facts of the case. 50 Arts 9 and 10. The punishment entailed a fi ne of Rds500 and banishment. Those who dared to return to the country after being banished could be declared outlawed. Any person who had been found guilty of treason in the past, was not eligible for election to an offi cial position. In addition, anyone who became aware of such treasonous conspiracies and failed to report it to the authorities within eight days, could be punished by a fi ne of Rds100 and one months' imprisonment: art 11.
(The penalty was later changed to a fi ne of Rds25 or arrest, depending on the facts of the case, and a two-year suspension of the right to vote: see Volksraadsnotule Part 1 (n 2) at 7 n 12). 51 Art 12. Each perpetrator could be punished by a fi ne of Rds25 or arrest, in accordance with the facts of the case, and a two-year suspension of the right to vote. This crime also included preventing others by the use of deeds or threats from exercising their rights. 52 Art 13. This crime included falsifi cation of signatures, altering documents, subscribing false names of persons or inserting anything into registers or public deeds after they had been fi nalised.
It was punishable with a fi ne of Rds300 and dismissal. 53 Art 8. The penalty was a fi ne of anything between Rds50 and Rds150 or imprisonment, depending on the circumstances. 54 Art 23. The penalty for the fi rst conviction was a fi ne of Rds20, for the second conviction Rds30 and for the third conviction Rds50 payable to the state.
Although the Thirty-Three Articles does not explicitly provide for the establishment of courts of law, 55 it does make provision for procedural regulations and for maintaining order in the courts. In particular, it stipulates that all court proceedings had to be held in public;
56 that all members of the public who attended such proceedings had to uncover their heads, "maintain a decorous and respectful silence", follow all the instructions of the President, 57 and not disrupt court proceedings;
58 that all members of the public present were obliged to assist the presiding offi cer in removing (arresting) disruptive elements from the court; 59 that judicial offi cers would not be prevented from doing their duties through insults or threats;
60 that a judicial offi cer could be disqualifi ed in the event of a confl ict of interests;
61 that a person had the right to either represent himself or appoint somebody 55 Rather, when read in its entirety, it becomes clear that the document assumed that such courts already existed. A magistrate's court was created for the territory west of the Drakensberg as early as Sep 1839. The fi rst magistrate to be appointed was J de Klerk (art 3 of the minutes of the Volksraad of 7 Sep 1839 published as "N.1, pp. 26-30" in Natal Volksraadsnotule (n 26) at 16-17). 56 Art 1. In the original document, this article referred to "teregtzittingen". Eybers (n 26) translated the term as "law sessions". 57 Art 2. The quoted translation is that of Eybers (n 26). It is possible that the use of the term "President" here probably referred to the presiding judicial offi cial. After the arrangements made by the Voortrekkers at Thaba Nchu on 2 Dec 1836 and later on 17 Apr 1837, the chief judicial offi cial (Gerhardus Marthinus Maritz) was referred to by various titles, including that of "rechter" (judge), "president", "President-Regter" (judge president) and "Magistraat" (magistrate), and that even after Retief had been elected as the political leader: see, eg, GS The wording of this provision was very detailed and prohibited disruption through any means whatsoever at any stage of the proceedings, including during the parties' arguments, the reading of the court's fi ndings, or the pronouncement of sentence. It specifi cally prohibited the making of noise, indicating one's approval or disapproval, or causing disruption through bodily movements. See, also, n 43 supra regarding the penalty for non-compliance. 59 Art 4. Although a penalty was prescribed, the article provided for the prosecution of persons who refused to assist the presiding offi cer. 60 Art 5. Transgressors would be charged and, if found guilty by an independent judicial offi cer, fi ned or imprisoned in accordance with the severity of the case. 61 Art 6 mentioned seven grounds for disqualifi cation, namely (1) if he was related to the "beklaagde of beschuldigde" (Eybers (n 26) translates these terms as the plaintiff or the defendant) within the third degree through blood or marriage; (2) if he had a personal interest in the matter; (3) if he had provided any written advice in the matter; (4) if he had received, or had been promised and accepted, any gifts from interested parties during the proceedings; (5) if he was the "voog, toeziende voog, redderaar of vermoedelyke erfgenaam of begiftigde" (guardian, supervising guardian, executor (cf Eybers (n 26) who translates "redderaar" as "agent") or probable heir or benefi ciary) of one of the parties; (6) if a high degree of enmity developed or existed between him and one of the parties; and (7) if any insults or threats had been exchanged between him and any of the parties since the start of the proceedings or within six months (it is not clear whether the six months referred to the period before or since the start of the proceedings; however, in light of the restriction that these grounds had to be raised at the start of the proceedings, this period probably referred to the former interpretation). A party to the proceedings or a member of the to act on his behalf (in legal proceedings) 62 although members of the Burgerraad could not represent others or give advice outside of public meetings; 63 and that the fi eld-cornet was obliged to hand over all so-called "onwilligers" 64 in his district to the magistrate. 65 In summary, the Thirty-Three Articles contained provisions mostly regarding the regulation of law and order. It was a basic guideline identifying the transgressions that were considered worth prosecuting. These included crimes against the national security as well as crimes against individuals. Further, it made provision for the enforcement of law in an orderly way in those forums where the crimes would be adjudicated. Lastly, it determined the law to be applied by the courts. This will be considered in the next section.
Burgerraad could raise one of these grounds of disqualifi cation in writing or orally at the start of the proceedings and before the hearing commenced (arts 6 and 7 read together). An eighth ground for immediate disqualifi cation appears to have been inserted in art 6 as an afterthought as it concerned not only court proceedings but extended to membership of the Burgerraad as well. It stated that "geene bastaarden … tot het tiende gelid" would be allowed to preside or sit as member of the Burgerraad. Eybers (n 26) translates this phrase as "no half-castes, down to the tenth degree", but the original meaning could also have been to exclude the illegitimately born, ie, those born out of wedlock, from court proceedings and other offi cial duties. 62 Art 16. 63 Art 15. Members of the Burgerraad could not act as a "scheidsman" (Eybers (n 26) translates it as an "umpire") either. The use of this term is ambiguous as it either indicated that members of the Burgerraad were prohibited from presiding in judicial processes or that they could not even try to settle disputes extra-judicially. The former interpretation would imply that there was a separation of powers between the judicial and legislative or executive authorities. Wichmann ((n 1) at 40) is of the opinion that there was no separation of powers at that time and that the Burgerraad also functioned as a court, although probably only as a court of appeal. The question regarding the separation of powers falls outside the scope of this contribution and will not be considered here. It should be noted that art 15 was amended by a decision of the Volksraad in 1864 in that members of the Volksraad were no longer prohibited from representing others in a court of law: see art 19 of the minutes of the Volksraad of 17 Feb 1864 published as "Staats Courant, 1 en 8 Mar. 1864" in Volksraadsnotule Part 5 (n 29) at 9-14. 64 Art 32. The meaning of the term "onwilligers" in this provision is not clear. It is translated by Eybers (n 26) as "undesirables [or, all persons unwilling to serve]", implying a reference to military service. Wichmann (n 1) does not include art 32 in his discussion of the Thirty-Three Articles (at 38-41). It is submitted that art 32 was not restricted to persons unwilling to serve or perform military duties. Rather, it was meant as a general provision concerning the practical application of law and order, in that it compelled the fi eld-cornets to apprehend any person suspected of any of the crimes mentioned in the Thirty-Three Articles and to hand him or her over to the offi ce of the magistrate to ensure the rule of law and a fair trial. Its purpose could, arguably, have been to prevent vigilante justice. 65 Two remaining provisions, namely arts 29 and 30, are not discussed here. They concerned nonjudicial matters regarding the settlements of the indigenous peoples and the election of members of the Volksraad respectively. For a discussion of these two provisions, see, eg, Wichmann (n 1) at 40-41.
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Article 31: The law to be applied
The most important provision for purposes of this contribution is article 31 which concerned the applicable law. It provided that in those cases where the legal principles laid down in the Thirty-Three Articles proved insuffi cient, Dutch law should serve as a guideline, although always in a moderate style and form in accordance with the customs of South Africa and to the benefi t and welfare of the community.
66
As mentioned above, the Thirty-Three Articles was confi rmed and approved by the unifi ed Volksraad of the ZAR on 23 May 1849. 67 Despite the apparently clear stipulations, there seemed to have been uncertainty regarding the applicable law. In 1853, Commandant-General AWJ Pretorius received a letter from one J Howell 68 containing some suggestions for the improvement of the newly created Republic. One of these suggestions was for an offi cial declaration on whether English law, Roman-Dutch law, the law of the Cape Colony, or the ZAR's own law should be the law applicable in the Republic. 31 of the Thirty-Three Articles, contained inaccuracies that could result in legal uncertainty. Furthermore, they stated that the use of Dutch law, a "[k]oninglyke wet", 71 was deemed inappropriate in a republic 72 such as the ZAR as it prescribed severe punishments for transgressions. They agreed that it was impossible to govern a country or nation without proper legislation (or law) as experience had shown and that, without it, the inhabitants of an otherwise beautiful and plentiful country would not be prevented from turning to destruction, chaos, discord and mockery. They proposed a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive 73 and the judiciary with an emphasis on the independence of the latter, but did not make any recommendation regarding the law to be applied. Instead, they proposed that all legislation should be promulgated by the legislature (namely the Volksraad) subject to approval by the nation within three months.
74
Despite the reservations expressed in the abovementioned 1856 document, the 1858 Constitution made no mention of the law to be applied. In the following year this was remedied with the promulgation 75 of an addendum to the Constitution. The purpose of this addendum, known as Addendum 1, 76 was to address the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of article 31 by providing clarity on the sources of law.
77 It stipulated that the law book of Van der Linden, in so far as it was not in confl ict with the Constitution, other legislation or decisions of the Volksraad, would remain the "law book" of the ZAR. 78 77 The preamble stated that the existing uncertainty regarding the applicable Dutch law was to the detriment of the citizens and caused the judicial offi cers much effort and doubt. 78 Art 1 of Addendum 1 referred to the "wetboek van van der Linden". 31 of the Thirty-Three Articles, contained inaccuracies that could result in legal uncertainty. Furthermore, they stated that the use of Dutch law, a "[k]oninglyke wet", 71 was deemed inappropriate in a republic 72 such as the ZAR as it prescribed severe punishments for transgressions. They agreed that it was impossible to govern a country or nation without proper legislation (or law) as experience had shown and that, without it, the inhabitants of an otherwise beautiful and plentiful country would not be prevented from turning to destruction, chaos, discord and mockery. They proposed a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive 73 and the judiciary with an emphasis on the independence of the latter, but did not make any recommendation regarding the law to be applied. Instead, they proposed that all legislation should be promulgated by the legislature (namely the Volksraad) subject to approval by the nation within three months. 74 Despite the reservations expressed in the abovementioned 1856 document, the 1858 Constitution made no mention of the law to be applied. In the following year this was remedied with the promulgation 75 of an addendum to the Constitution. The purpose of this addendum, known as Addendum 1, 76 was to address the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of article 31 by providing clarity on the sources of law. 77 It stipulated that the law book of Van der Linden, in so far as it was not in confl ict with the Constitution, other legislation or decisions of the Volksraad, would remain the "law book" of the ZAR. 78 inadequately or not at all, the law book of Simon van Leeuwen and the Inleiding tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleertheyd of Grotius would be binding. 79 Nevertheless, the use of these three legal works 80 remained subject to the restrictions set out in article 31 of the Thirty-Three Articles, 81 namely that it should always be interpreted in a moderate style and form in accordance with the customs of South Africa 82 and to the benefi t and welfare of the community.
Addendum 1 in effect created a constitutionally entrenched hierarchy of sources of law. In order of importance, these sources of law were legislation, custom and the specifi ed common-law authors, again in order of importance, Van der Linden, Leeuwen and Grotius. 83 In 1866, the Volksraad received two petitions from the public regarding article 31. In the fi rst, received from Rustenburg, 84 the petitioners complained, among other matters, that Dutch law was unsuitable and should not apply in the ZAR. They proposed that new and more suitable laws be drafted by two or three representatives from each district who were familiar with the local customs. In the second, received from Potchefstroom, 85 the petitioners complained about the application of foreign, monarchic laws in the "vrije Republiek" of the ZAR. In particular, they were offended by the continued use of Van der Linden as an authoritative source of law. They wanted to know why Van der Linden, who was no longer seen as an authoritative source in his own country, should be so highly regarded in the ZAR. They pointed out that their (ancestors) had left Holland because of the oppressive Dutch laws and called for new legislation to be drafted by the ZAR legislature that would satisfy the general population. Lastly, they complained that the three authoritative works of Van 79 Art 2 of Addendum 1 referred to the "wetboek van Simon van Leeuwen en de Inleiding van Hugo de Groot". 80 It has been suggested that the choice of these three legal works had a lot to do with the fact that they had been written in Dutch, as knowledge of Latin (the only other language in which some of the other important works on Roman-Dutch law were available at that time) was probably rare in the ZAR during those early years: see Farlam (n 9) at 402. In addition, all three these works had been regarded as authoritative in former Dutch colonies such as the Cape, Guiana and Ceylon (ibid der Linden, Grotius and Leeuwen were unobtainable and therefore inaccessible to the man on the street. The Volksraad responded positively and agreed that there was a need to compile the laws of the ZAR in one code ("wetboek"). 86 After much debate and an initial suggestion to appoint a commission to codify the laws of the ZAR which would contain all the legislation previously issued there, 87 it was eventually decided that the President and the Executive Council would be responsible for submitting new laws for approval to the Volksraad. In the interim, the existing position would pertain until such time as it was repealed. 88 In other words, Roman-Dutch law would apply in those cases where the Constitution and the Thirty-Three Articles were silent -not generally though, but in the limited sense referred to above. 89 Moreover, the Volksraad expressed the wish that the citizens would be more supportive of the legislature and invited the public to participate in the process by submitting suggestions for new laws and to raise their grievances regarding any existing repugnant or harmful laws.
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Despite the apparent enthusiasm for a complete overhaul of the laws of the ZAR, nothing ever came of the proposed codifi cation. Article 31 of the Thirty-Three Articles remained in force. The courts of the ZAR continued to apply Roman-Dutch law as contained in the three authoritative works of Van der Linden, Leeuwen and Grotius. 91 The next section will consider the application of article 31 by the courts as illustrated by a few decisions. Des. 1866" in Volksraadsnotule Part 6 (n 84) at 22-24. 91 These three common-law sources were used until the end of the century as is apparent from requests for copies of these works from, eg, the special magistrate for Barberton and the public prosecutor for Middelburg (see, respectively, TAB SS 2595 R15543/90 and TAB SP 195 SPR481/99: this reference is to the National Archives Repository (Pretoria) (TAB) followed by the relevant document series). The works were apparently used not only by lawyers and judicial offi cials, but also by the public, as is evident from a similar request from a teacher (see TAB OD 0 OR9888/97) for copies of Van der Linden's "Wetboek" and the "Lokale Wetboek", the latter probably referring to In Rooth v The State, a decision of the High Court of the ZAR in 1888, the Court had to decide whether the applicants could reclaim transfer duties in terms of the condictio indebiti on the ground that they had been ignorant of the law. Counsel for the applicants relied on the authoritative sources as prescribed by the Thirty-Three Articles and Addendum 1 to the 1858 Constitution and argued that money paid in error, whether in fact or in law, could be recovered. The Court confi rmed that it was obliged to follow the three prescribed texts, but qualifi ed this obligation by saying that "in the interpretation and use of these three textbooks the Court shall always proceed in the manner prescribed by [Art] 31 of the thirty-three Articles". 93 The Court found that since none of these three works addressed the question before it "satisfactorily or with clearness," 94 it not only had a discretion to depart from that authority, but was compelled to follow the Roman-Dutch law "yet upon a reasonable system and in accordance with the usage of South Africa, and for the benefi t and welfare of the community". 95 The Court then proceeded to look at various other authorities on Roman-Dutch law, French law, German law and English law and to consider also the opinions of Roman jurists and the commentators, before concluding that monies could not be recovered on the basis of error iuris. The majority found that since the Roman-Dutch authorities 99 were undecided on this question, a decision of the Supreme Court of the Cape 100 and one of the High Court of the Orange Free State 101 should be followed because "this course is pointed out to us by the provision in the Thirty-Three Articles". However, it did not elaborate further on the reason for this approach. As a result, the Court held that article 16 of the Placaat of 1540 indeed applied in the ZAR and that the fees of law agents became prescribed within two years.
with some single subject, but an ordinance which strove to amend existing abuses and to introduce some uniformity into the practice of the courts" (at 221). The preamble of the Placaat confi rms "that it was promulgated in order to … remedy the expense connected with lawsuits, and to provide for a pure administration of justice which would deal equally with both rich and poor" (tr Wessels at 218). 2001) 118 SALJ 532-555 esp at 542, 547-552. In short, art 16 of the Placaat provided that the fees of advocates, attorneys, secretaries, doctors of medicine, surgeons, apothecaries, clerks, notaries and other labourers prescribed after two years. The only exception to this rule was where the debt had been put in writing, in which case the claim prescribed after ten years. In the event that the principal debtor died, the creditor had two years from the date of hearing of the death to claim the debt from the heir. In truth, it is diffi cult to determine from the report what the Court's view on the application or not of the 1540 Placaat was. The reported judgement appears to contain confl icting views which may possibly be due to the fact that there were majority and minority decisions. On the one hand the Court expressed its doubt (at 58) at the correctness of the decision in Drew v The Executors of Wolfe (n 100 supra) and held that while the plaintiff had tried to prove that the 1540 Placaat had fallen into disuse in the Orange Free State, it would have been suffi cient for him to prove that the Placaat was no longer in use in the Netherlands. The Court was satisfi ed that the latter had indeed been proven and even went further to say that those who alleged that the Placaat still applied, had to prove that it had been resurrected ("degene die beweert dat het Plakaat van 1540 ergens nog van kracht is, moet bewijzen dat het aldaar wederom in leven geroepen is geworden door eene latere wetsbepaling") (at 58). The Court consequently held that a prescription period of two years did not apply to medical bills (at 59). On the other hand, however, in the last paragraph, the report states that the Court agreed with the judgement in Drew v The Executors of Wolfe and held that the fees of medical doctors prescribed after two years (at 59).
In a dissenting judgement, Morice J gave a very different interpretation of the provisions of the Thirty-Three Articles. He likewise considered the three RomanDutch authors, 102 but concluded that according to them, article 16 of the 1540 Placaat had fallen into disuse. 103 Furthermore, he was of the opinion that the Cape and Free State decisions referred to by the majority did not constitute evidence of the customs of the ZAR. By contrast, he was of the view that, taking into account local circumstances such as the great distances, the slow means of communication and the fact that "a large proportion of the population live [d] in wagons during half the year", it was not a custom in the ZAR to recognise the prescription of the fees of law agents within two years. He held that " [a] custom means what is practised amongst ordinary persons, and not an interpretation of Roman-Dutch Law by Judges". Finally, Morice J emphasised that in terms of the Thirty-Three Articles, Dutch law had to be followed to promote the welfare of the state; in his opinion an interpretation allowing for a prescription of legal fees within two years did not promote that welfare. conspiracy. 112 The fi rst four accused had pleaded guilty to the fi rst charge in that they had "treated, conspired, agreed with and urged Leander Starr Jameson, an alien residing without the boundaries of [the ZAR], to come into the territory of [the ZAR] at the head of and with an armed and hostile troop and to make a hostile invasion …".
113
The judgement centred around which law was applicable: Roman-Dutch law or the local law of the ZAR? Article 9 of the Thirty-Three Articles provided for the punishment for treason.
114
Counsel for the defence pointed out that the prosecution had not proved that Jameson was a representative of any foreign government, but simply that he "came in as a private man and was in charge of armed men". 115 The contention was that the accused were therefore guilty of a lesser crime than that contained in article 9 of the Thirty-Three Articles, which concerned acts of treason with foreign governments, their governors or offi cials. Since article 9 prescribed the penalty of banishment and a fi ne of Rds500, counsel argued that a lesser form of punishment accordingly applied.
116
For its part the prosecution argued that Jameson was a "robber and a freebooter" and that it was "regarded as more serious for persons to conspire with freebooters or robbers against the independence of the country than it would be if they had conspired with the government of a foreign Power". The prosecution was of the view that article 9 did not apply; instead, Roman-Dutch law as contained in Van der Linden's textbook had to be followed in sentencing the accused.
117
The judgement of the Court was brief. Gregorowski J held that article 9 dealt "only with certain open treasonable acts, such as corresponding with a view to [an] invasion by a foreign Power, which is not on the same footing as the present case, will not be discussed in further detail here as it was accepted that the crimes committed did not constitute high treason and was therefore not judged in terms of art 9 of the Thirty-Three Articles. Moreover, the main controversy surrounding the trial was rather concerned with the death sentence imposed on the fi rst four accused. 112 For more detail on the four charges, see "High treason" (n 105) at 16-17. 113 Ibid, emphasis added. It is interesting to observe that at the time, criticism was not only levelled at the severity of the sentences, but also at the counsel of the defendants who advised their clients to plead guilty. See, eg, 30 Apr 1896 The Manchester Guardian; 1 May 1896 The Manchester Guardian. 114 See n 50 supra. Art 9 stipulated as follows: "All those who shall have formed plans or come to an understanding with foreign powers or their governors or offi cials with a view to inducing them to perform acts of hostility or to undertake the waging of war, or with a view to supplying them with the means necessary thereto, and those who attempt to commit treason, shall be punished with a fi ne of 500 Rix-dollars and shall be expelled from our community, and on returning shall be declared outlawed" (tr Eybers (n 26)). Gregorowski maintained that art 9 did not apply to the lesser crime of crimen laesae majestatis (Gregorowski (n 105) at 323 where [an] invasion has actually been brought about". 118 As a result, the penalty prescribed in article 9 was not applicable. Rather, the Court was obliged to apply article 31 of the Thirty-Three Articles in terms of which Roman-Dutch law, and in particular Van der Linden's work, had to be followed. 119 The Court then proceeded to impose the death sentence on the fi rst four accused. 120 As already mentioned, the judgement elicited strong criticism. First, Gregorowski was criticised for not, at the very least, bearing in mind "the mildness of the legislation of the uneducated old Voortrekkers". 121 Secondly, he was criticised for his interpretation of Van der Linden's prescribed punishment. The relevant text in Van der Linden's Koopmanshandboek stated that the punishment for high treason was in general the sentence of death, but that the merits of the case had to be taken into account. 122 Gregorowski was lambasted for choosing to interpret Van der Linden's guideline in the strictest sense possible in order to impose the maximum sentence. 123 Thirdly, and (for purposes of this contribution) most importantly, it was pointed out that Gregorowski could have chosen to follow Roman-Dutch law with respect to high treason and crimen laesio majestatis as it had been interpreted by the Cape courts. 124 The law of the ZAR was decried in that it had "by local legislation been reduced to a hide-bound system", dependent on three law books which, "however good in themselves, were never intended to form a complete digest of the laws required by a civilised state". 125 In a jurisdiction such as the Cape, where the interpretation of the Roman-Dutch law was not "bound down to Thirty-three Articles or to the dictum of one single text writer", 126 the courts were able to exercise their discretion in passing sentences according to the merits of each case.
127 Surprisingly, Gregorowski responded publicly to these criticisms. 128 He vehemently denied the allegations that he had been prejudiced before or during the trial. Furthermore, he defended his decision to pronounce the death sentence on several grounds, namely the severity of the crimes committed, 129 his suspicion, even before the trial, that any death sentence would be commuted, 130 and the fact that English law punished all treasonous acts by death. 131 He further contended that the prescribed fi ne in terms of article 9, namely Rds500 (£37 10s at that time) was not "an adequate and proper punishment" for "a parcel of millionaires". 127 Idem at 170. The reviewer here seems to have lost sight of the fact that the Cape trials were in accordance with statutory prescriptions (see n 124 supra). For example, in sentencing Pieter de Villiers, the Court held that it was bound by s 32 of The Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act 6 of 1900 (Cape) and expressed the sentiment that it was unfortunate that they could not sentence the accused to imprisonment but could only impose a fi ne ((1901) 18 SALJ (n 123) at 175-176). Section 32 provided: "No person who complied with the provisions of a certain proclamation relating the laying down of arms by certain residents in the districts of Aliwal North, Wodehouse, and Barkly East, issued by Brigadier-General Brabant, dated at Dordrecht the 22nd day of February, 1900, and who shall have surrendered thereunder shall, if prosecuted under this Act, be liable to the punishment of death or imprisonment." Unfortunately, I was not able to uncover any further information on Brabant's proclamation. 128 Gregorowski (n 105). 129 Idem at 313-314, 325. He had taken into account factors such as the pre-meditation of the accused, their purpose and intended consequences, as well as the real consequences of the invasion, including that many had lost their lives, property or fortunes as a result of the events. 130 Idem at 316. 131 Idem at 321-322, 325. 132 Idem at 313. Many of the accused were eminent and wealthy persons. Solomon (n 110) at 96 pointed out that the alternative punishment mentioned by Van der Linden, namely banishment for life, would have been a viable and suffi ciently severe punishment, especially for those accused with business interests in the ZAR. He criticised Gregorowsky for not imposing this alternative punishment instead.
Conclusion
Until the end of the nineteenth century, article 31 of the Thirty-Three Articles determined the law to be applied in the ZAR by creating a constitutionally entrenched hierarchy of sources of law. In order of importance, these sources of law were legislation, custom, 133 and the specifi ed authors on Roman-Dutch law, namely, in order of importance, Van der Linden, Leeuwen and Grotius. However, the courts did not always treat article 31 as a rigid rule, but rather as a fl exible guideline. For example, antiquated legislation that contradicted existing custom or did not promote the welfare of the state could be declared to have fallen into disuse.
134 Also, if the three prescribed Roman-Dutch authorities were found to be silent on a point or did not provide a clear answer to a question, the court not only had a discretion to depart from them, but was compelled to follow other Roman-Dutch (and other relevant) authorities on that point, provided that it was reasonable, not in confl ict with local custom and that it promoted the welfare of the state. 135 The interpretation of article 31 depended to a great extent on the court's approach, and whether it followed a fl exible or a rigid 136 interpretation.
Abstract
The Thirty-Three Articles was adopted by the Potchefstroom Burgerraad on 9 April 1844 and confi rmed four years later on 23 May 1849 by the unifi ed Volksraad of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek at Derdepoort. The Thirty-Three Articles contained provisions pertaining to general and judicial administration and was held out as a kind of constitution in its day. It retained its status as a basic law despite the adoption of the constitutions of 1858, 1889 and 1896, and was only repealed in 1901 after the British annexation of the Republic. The Thirty-Three Articles had a lasting impact on the legal development of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek. This contribution examines its nature and content, focusing in particular on article 31 which made provision for the law to be applied. Reference is made to three different approaches in the application of this provision by the courts.
